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INV ITED
P A P E R
Impact and Detection of GNSS
Jammers on Consumer Grade
Satellite Navigation Receivers
This paper provides a comprehensive discussion of jamming effects on commercial
GNSS receivers. The main types of jammers are discussed as well as state-of-the-art
detection methods.
By Daniele Borio, Fabio Dovis, Heidi Kuusniemi, and Letizia Lo Presti
ABSTRACT | Jamming is the act of intentionally directing
powerful electromagnetic waves toward a victim receiver
with the ultimate goal of denying its operations. This paper
describes the main types of Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) jammers and reviews their impact on GNSS
receivers. A survey of state-of-the-art methods for jamming
detection is also provided. Different detection approaches
are investigated with respect to the receiver stage where
they can be implemented.
KEYWORDS | Detection; Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS); interference; jamming
I . INTRODUCTION
Received Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
signals are very weak and thus vulnerable to both inten-
tional and nonintentional radio-frequency interference
(RFI). Jamming is a form of intentional RFI generated by
devices, called jammers, which deliberately transmit
powerful signals at the GNSS frequencies. Jammers can
disrupt GNSS-based services in wide geographical areas
with radii of several kilometers [1] and, despite the fact
that their usage is illegal in most countries, their rapid
diffusion is becoming a serious threat to satellite
navigation. Several GNSS applications such as tracking
of goods and of animals, train and ship localization,
sport applications, and pay-as-you-drive services inevita-
bly introduce privacy issues. In particular, these appli-
cations are used to collect user location information.
This motivates the development and use of devices
which can deny GNSS signal reception [2]. A well-
known example is the case of a truck driver periodi-
cally passing close to the Newark Liberty International
Airport. The driver was using a GNSS jammer to
prevent his company from tracking his position.
The jammer was however so powerful that problems
were caused to the reception of wide area augmentation
system (WAAS) and GNSS signals. Eventually, after
three months of investigation, the authorities were able
to identify the problem, locate the jammer, and fine the
truck driver [3].
This paper describes the main types of GNSS jam-
mers and reviews their impact on GNSS receivers. Jam-
mer classifications from the literature are discussed and
a composite description based on both signal and device
characteristics is proposed.
The impact analysis considers the different receiver
stages and shows the different effects which can be expe-
rienced by a GNSS receiver. Jamming effects strongly de-
pend on the power of the jamming signal and range from
a slight performance degradation to a complete loss of
position.
The paper also provides a survey of state-of-the-art
methods for jamming detection. While many methods
are proposed for the more general topic of RFI detection
[4]–[7], recent researches considered techniques specifi-
cally tailored for jamming signals [2], [8]–[14]. In this
paper, different approaches are reviewed and analyzed
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with respect to the different receiver stages where they
can be implemented. The analysis of the countermeasures
which can be adopted to mitigate the jamming effect are
out of the scope of the paper. A survey on the main
general techniques can be found, for example, in [15].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the main characteristics of a jam-
ming signal and discusses different jammer classifica-
tions. The impact of jamming is analyzed in Section III
whereas jamming detection approaches are presented in
Section IV. Finally, conclusions are provided in
Section V.
II . SIGNAL MODEL IN THE PRESENCE
OF JAMMING
GNSS signals are at first downconverted to intermediate
frequency (IF) and transformed in a digital sequence,
sIF½n" ¼ sIFðnTsÞ, by the receiver front-end. Ts ¼ 1=fs is
the sampling interval and fs is the sampling frequency.
Received satellite signals are buried in noise and the dig-
ital sequence provided by the receiver front-end can be
modeled as
y½n" ¼ sIF½n" þ w½n" (1)
where w½n" is a realization of a zero-mean white discrete-
time Gaussian noise W½n" with variance !2w. This ran-
dom process is obtained by filtering and sampling a
white noise, WðtÞ, with power spectral density (PSD)
N0=2. Since the bandwidth of the front-end filter is
generally of the order of fs=2, the variance of W½n" is
approximately
!2w ¼
N0fs
2
: (2)
The useful signal sIF½n" is given by [16]
sIF½n" ¼
XI'1
i¼0
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2Ci
p
diðnTs ' "iÞciðnTs ' "iÞ
( cos 2#ðfIF þ fd;iÞnTs þ ’i
" #
(3)
that is the summation of I components transmitted by
the satellites in view. In (3), the index i indicates quan-
tities specific to the ith satellite signal. Ci is the re-
ceived signal power; and "i, fd;i, and ’i are the delay,
Doppler frequency, and carrier phase introduced by the
communication channel on the ith satellite signal, re-
spectively. cið(Þ and dið(Þ model the spreading code and
the navigation message whereas fIF denotes the IF used
by the receiver front-end. In (3), an IF representation
for the useful signal is adopted. Different representa-
tions, for example, considering baseband signals [17],
could have been adopted.
In the presence of jamming, the IF discrete-time
signal recovered by the receiver front-end can be
modeled as
y½n" ¼ sIF½n" þ vq½n" þ w½n" (4)
where q½n" is the IF digital version of the signal qðtÞ,
generated by a jammer, and v is an amplitude factor.
In particular, assuming that q½n" has unit power, the
total received jamming power is given by
J ¼ v2: (5)
Given these premises, it is possible to define the fol-
lowing metrics which are adopted in the literature to
characterize signal and jammer power relationships.
• The carrier-to-noise density power ratio ðC=N0Þ
defined as the ratio of the signal power C and
noise PSD N0. The C=N0 is continuously esti-
mated by the receiver and it is usually provided
in logarithmic units, dB-Hz.
• The jammer-to-noise density power ratio ðJ=N0Þ
defined as the ratio of the jamming power J
and N0.
• The jammer-to-signal power ratio ðJ=SÞ defined
as the ratio between J and C and usually ex-
pressed in dB.
• The jammer-to-noise power ratio ðJ=NÞ defined
as the ratio between J and !2w, the noise power.
A. Jamming Signals
Several papers [1], [2], [18]–[21] have addressed the
problem of characterizing the jamming signal qðtÞ. From
the analysis, it emerged that most jammers used in a civil
context broadcast frequency modulated signals with an
almost periodic behavior. Deviations from a perfectly pe-
riodic behavior are due to drifts in the local oscillators
used for the signal generation. The signal center fre-
quency varies according to a periodic pattern that, in
most cases, corresponds to a saw-tooth function. More
specifically, qðtÞ can be modeled as
qðtÞ ¼ ffiffiffi2p cos 2# fRF þ fqðtÞ" #t þ ’q$ % (6)
where fqðtÞ is the instantaneous frequency of the jam-
ming signal, fRF denotes the radio frequency (RF), and
’q models the signal phase. The amplitude variations of
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qðtÞ are usually small (less than 0.5 dB) [1] and thus they
are neglected in (6). The amplitude of the jamming
signal is accounted for by the multiplicative factor in (4),
v, which is considered constant. fqðtÞ defines a practically
periodic frequency pattern which is characterized by a
sweep range, i.e., the frequency interval affected by the
jammer signal, and a sweep period which is the time re-
quired to span the sweep range. The maximum and mini-
mum values assumed by fqðtÞ, fmax, and fmin, also play a
fundamental role since they determine the spectral
overlap between GNSS and jamming signals.
The spectrogram of the signal emitted by a cigarette
lighter jammer is shown in Fig. 1. In this case, fqðtÞ de-
fines a piecewise linear pattern with a sweep range of
16.7 MHz and a sweep period of about 8.9 !s. Although
the frequency pattern shown in Fig. 1 is quite regular,
more complex frequency behaviors can be found [1],
[18]–[21]. Fig. 1 also shows the instantaneous power of
the jamming signal. The power has been estimated using
an analysis window sliding through the samples of the
jamming signal: only small power variations can be
observed.
The shorter the sweep period, the more difficult it is
to mitigate the impact of the jammer. Fast frequency
varying signals are more difficult to track and, for
example, a notch filter [22] will have more difficulties to
estimate the jammer instantaneous frequency and re-
move the disturbing signal. Sweep periods are typically
around 10 !s whereas sweep ranges are usually in the
10–40-MHz interval [1], [21].
The signal model introduced in Section II is related
to a single GNSS frequency. However, GNSS jammers
can simultaneously broadcast several signals in different
GNSS bands. Analysis from the literature [21] shows that
no significant differences emerge from jamming signals
broadcast in different bands.
Depending on the properties of fqðtÞ, different classi-
fications have been suggested for GNSS jammers. In par-
ticular, Rash [23] divided GNSS jammers into three
categories based on the properties of the jamming signal
transmitted. This classification was based on the charac-
teristics of the Global Positioning System (GPS) L1 signal
which was the only civil signal available in the late
1990s. Moreover, the only form of jamming was military
in nature and devices for civil use were not considered.
More appropriate classifications have been recently pro-
posed [1], [18]. Kraus et al. [18] divided jammers into
the following classes:
• class I: CW signals; the jammer transmits a con-
tinuous wave (CW) signal;
• class II: single saw-tooth chirp signals; the jam-
mer transmits a frequency-modulated signal with
a saw-tooth time-frequency (TF) evolution;
• class III: multi-saw-tooth chirp signals; the device
transmits a frequency-modulated signal but its TF
evolution is more complex and it is determined
by the combination of several saw-tooth
functions;
• class IV: chirp with signal frequency bursts; the
device transmits a frequency-modulated signal
and frequency bursts are used to enlarge the fre-
quency band affected by the disturbing signal.
It is noted that model (6) is general and can be used to
describe signals belonging to the four classes listed
above. For example, CW signals (class I) are obtained
for a constant jamming frequency fqðtÞ. Periodic saw-tooth
functions can be used to model the instantaneous fre-
quency fqðtÞ of signals emitted by class II and class III
jammers. The introduction of frequency jumps in the
behavior of fqðtÞ allows one to model class IV jamming
signals [18].
B. Jammer Devices
Jamming signals can be broadcast by a large variety
of devices which can have different characteristics. A
jammer classification based on the device characteristics
was suggested in [1]. In particular, jammers were divided
into three groups [1]:
• group I: cigarette lighter jammers; the device is
designed to be plugged into an automotive ciga-
rette lighter with a 12-V power supply;
• group II: SubMiniature version A (SMA) battery
jammers; the device is powered by a battery and
it is connected to an external antenna through an
SMA connector;
• group III: non-SMA battery jammers; the device
is powered by a battery and uses an integrated
antenna for transmission.
This classification is complementary to that suggested in
[18] and reviewed in Section II-A. The two classifications
consider different aspects of jamming devices and can be
combined as in Fig. 2. In this way, a composite jammer
Fig. 1. Spectrogram and power of the signal emitted by a
cigarette lighter jammer.
Vol. 104, No. 6, June 2016 | Proceedings of the IEEE 1235
Borio et al. : Impact and Detection of GNSS Jammers on Consumer Grade Satellite Navigation Receivers
classification able to capture both signal and device char-
acteristics is obtained. Although the two classifications
considered are able to capture most jammer characteris-
tics, the following aspects should also be taken into
account:
• single-frequency versus multiple-frequency jam-
mers: jammers can simultaneously affect several
GNSS bands;
• single-antenna versus multiple-antenna jammers:
some jammers are equipped with several anten-
nas in order to broadcast signals in different fre-
quency bands;
• single-system versus multiple-system jammers:
some jammers simultaneously affect GNSS and
other communications systems such as Global
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS).
These aspects are particularly relevant for the design of
jamming mitigation and location techniques. For exam-
ple, several location techniques are based on time differ-
ence of arrival (TDOA) which requires precise time
synchronization. When GNSS services are denied, other
communications signals can be used to achieve precise
synchronization. When a multiple-system jammer is used,
this type of approach is no longer valid and a different
solution has to be adopted.
III . JAMMING IMPACT
In most cases, the goal of malicious jammers is to totally
deny GNSS-based services in a certain geographical area.
Despite the clear threat posed by a jammer broadcasting
a sufficiently strong power, such a scenario is anyway
clearly detectable and properly designed GNSS-based
services are able to switch to backup non-GNSS
positioning means or raise a warning for the users. Inter-
mediate power values turn out to be the most dangerous
cases, since sometimes they might be severe enough to
significantly decrease the receiver performance, but not
severe enough to make the receiver lose lock or to pre-
vent the acquisition of satellite signals. For such a rea-
son, in order to understand the effect of jamming, it is of
interest to consider such cases of intermediate jamming
power. As an example, the impact of a jamming signal
on a high-sensitivity consumer GNSS receiver, a u-blox
LEA-6T receiver, is shown in Fig. 3 which considers dif-
ferent receiver metrics sensitive to jamming. The jam-
ming scenario considered in Fig. 3 is the one described
in [22]. In this case, a cigarette lighter jammer was used
to disturb GNSS signal reception in a controlled envi-
ronment, a large anechoic chamber installed in the Joint
Research Centre (JRC) premises in Ispra, Italy. The
power emitted by the jammer was controlled using a
variable attenuator and J=N0 was varied between 55 and
92 dB-Hz. At the beginning of the experiment, the at-
tenuation was set to the maximum value allowed. In
this case, the jammer had a reduced impact on receiver
operations. The attenuation provided was then progres-
sively reduced and thus the jamming power was pro-
gressively increased. After about 20 min, the maximum
jamming power was achieved. At this point the attenua-
tion was increased again until the maximum value was
achieved. Additional details on the experimental setup
considered for this experiment can be found in [22].
The upper plot of Fig. 3 shows the average C=N0
obtained considering only satellite signals with individual
C=N0 values greater than 30 dB-Hz: this was a conven-
tional choice adopted to avoid artifacts due to discon-
tinuous signal tracking. When the jamming power is
maximum, the average C=N0 is attenuated of about 15 dB.
The second plot in Fig. 3 shows the automatic gain
control (AGC) counts which assumes, for the u-blox
receiver, values in the range 0–8191 [24]. In the
Fig. 3. Impact of a jamming signal on a high-sensitivity GNSS
receiver. Different metrics sensitive to the jamming signal are
provided.
Fig. 2. Composite jammer classification accounting for both
signal and device characteristics.
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presence of jamming, the AGC count is significantly re-
duced. Finally, the bottom part of Fig. 3 shows the hori-
zontal accuracy of the position solution as estimated by
the u-blox receiver. When the received jamming power
is maximum, the position accuracy is significantly
degraded.
In the following sections, the impact on the different
stages of the receiver is briefly discussed. Other exam-
ples of impact assessment of interference on GNSS re-
ceivers can be found in [15], [25], and [26]. It has to be
remarked that the detailed description of the receiver ar-
chitecture is out of the scope of this paper. The inter-
ested reader can refer, for example, to [27].
A. Impact on the Front-End Stage
The front-end is the first receiver stage which can be
affected by jamming. The front-end has the goal to filter
the incoming signal in the bandwidth of interest, down-
converting it to the chosen IF before performing the analog-
to-digital (AD) conversion. Modern receivers are designed
as multibit devices, thus requiring the presence of an
AGC between the analog portion of the front-end and the
analog-to-digital converter (ADC). Jamming impacts the
AGC values as shown in the middle plot of Fig. 3 and
modifies the distribution of the samples at the output of
the ADC. This effect is shown in Fig. 4, where the case
study described in Fig. 3 is analyzed at instants T ¼ 200 s
and T ¼ 1200 s. When jamming appears, the statistic of
the samples is clearly changed and deviations from a
Gaussian distribution can be clearly seen. In the case con-
sidered in Fig. 4, the AGC is still able to compress the in-
put signal. However, saturation effects start appearing
and only a few levels of the quantisation scale are actually
used to represent the useful signal.
The front-end is made of highly nonlinear compo-
nents and in the presence of strong jamming signals sev-
eral elements of the front-end (filters, amplifiers) may
be led to work outside their nominal regions, generating
nonlinear effects, or clipping phenomena (signal ampli-
tude exceeding the hardware capability to treat them). In
both cases, spurious harmonics are generated and mixed
to the useful signal in the front-end itself.
B. Impact on the Acquisition Stage
The first digital signal processing stage of a GNSS re-
ceiver is the acquisition block which has to determine
the signal presence and to provide a rough estimate of
the signal code delay and Doppler frequency [16]. The
main operation performed by the acquisition block is to
correlate input signal (4) with local replicas of the signal
code and carrier. In this respect, a bidimensional func-
tion, called cross-ambiguity function (CAF) is evaluated.
The CAF is a function of the Doppler frequencies and
code delays tested by the acquisition block. When the
GNSS signal is present and in the absence of interfer-
ence, a single dominant peak should appear in the CAF.
The peak reveals the signal presence and it is located at
the approximate signal code delay and Doppler shift.
Fig. 5 compares CAFs evaluated in the absence and in
the presence of a CW Interference (CWI). The interfer-
ing power is equal to "130 dBW and the CAF is evalu-
ated using 1 ms of coherent integration time and three
noncoherent accumulations. The peak-to-noise-floor sep-
aration decreases as the interfering power increases, thus
increasing the probability of erroneously declaring the
signal presence. Moreover, the acquisition block may
provide erroneous Doppler and delay estimates. The ef-
fects of CWI interference on the acquisition block are
analyzed in [28] whereas an extensive study of the ef-
fects of several kinds of interference on the acquisition
probabilities can be found in [26].
C. Impact on the Tracking Stage
The signals detected by the acquisition stage are
passed to the tracking block which is responsible for pro-
viding fine estimates of the signal parameters. These esti-
mates are used to generate GNSS measurements such as
pseudoranges, carrier phases, and Doppler shifts. Jam-
ming has a direct consequence on the quality of the mea-
surements produced by the tracking stage causing
increased measurement variances, biases, and
Fig. 4. Histograms of the samples at the ADC output in the
absence of interference (top) and in the presence of a swept
jamming signal (bottom).
Fig. 5. Comparison of the CAF for a GPS L1 C/A acquisition search
space in an interference-free environment (left) and in the
presence of an in-band CW signal at "130 dBW (right).
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measurement outliers [15], [26]. The tracking stage usu-
ally adopts a closed-loop architecture where tracking
loops are used to track the different signal components.
A tracking loop is made of several components such as
signal correlators, loop discriminators, and loop filters
[16]. Correlators evaluate the correlation of the input sig-
nal y½n", with locally generated replicas of the signal code
and carrier. Such replicas are generated on the basis of
signal parameter estimates and correlator outputs are af-
fected by the errors between the estimated and actual
signal parameter values (code delay, Doppler frequency,
and carrier phase). In standard receiver architectures,
three correlators, Prompt, Early and Late, are generally
used for code tracking whereas the Prompt correlator
alone is sufficient for carrier tracking [16]. Loop discrim-
inators use the correlator outputs to provide a measure
of the error between the estimated and actual signal pa-
rameters. Under normal conditions, the discriminator
output is driven to zero by the loop. Thus, the discrimi-
nator output can be used to assess the impact of jam-
ming. An example of the effect of interference is shown
in Figs. 6 and 7 which consider the discriminator outputs
of code and carrier tracking loops in the presence of two
types of interference. In the upper parts of the figures, a
#130-dBW in-band CWI is considered whereas in the
bottom plots the effects of a #130-dBW single-saw-tooth
chirp signal with a sweep range of 16.7-MHz bandwidth,
centered around L1, and a sweep rate of 8.9 !s, are ana-
lyzed. In both cases, the receiver correctly locks on the
GNSS signal during the first part of the experiments
which are performed in the absence of interference. Af-
ter 9.3 s, interference is injected with detrimental effects
on the discriminator outputs.
In this example, the receiver is configured to have a
phase lock loop (PLL) bandwidth equal to 10 Hz and a
delay lock loop (DLL) bandwidth, BDLL ¼ 2 Hz. The
spacing between the early and late replicas of the local
code is set to 0.9 code chips. The presence of a CW,
shifted by 200 kHz with respect to the GNSS signal in
space (SIS) [thus in correspondence of a spectral line of
the GPS coarse acquisition (C/A) signal], not only in-
creases the noise level but leads to a sort of oscillating
behavior at the discriminator outputs. The effects on the
PLL are shown in Fig. 7: when in the presence of a
strong CWI, a sudden jump of the phase discriminator
output is detected as soon as interference is injected
onto the received signal. The presence of the jamming
signal leads to an overall increase of both code and phase
discriminator output variance. It can be noted that,
when considering non-CWI, the ultimate effect of the
jammer after the discriminator can be modeled as an in-
crease of the noise power disrupting the useful signal.
Furthermore, the phase tracking is more affected than
the code tracking, and, as it can be noted, the dis-
criminator output overcomes the typical 3" threshold
(evaluated on the noninterfered signal) considered as
the upper bound value for the loop to keep the lock
state [16].
When tracking data channels, as in the GPS C/A
case, the Prompt correlator is also used for decoding the
navigation message. Data decoding can be significantly
affected by jamming: depending on the power received
and on the type of jamming signal, different effects can
occur. In general, an increased bit error rate (BER) is ex-
perienced and, in the worst cases, the receiver is unable
to decode the navigation message. The detailed analysis
Fig. 6. GPS L1 C/A tracking performance: code discriminator
output in the presence of a #130-dBW in-band CWI (top) and in
the presence of a single-saw-tooth chirp signal at #130 dBW
(bottom).
Fig. 7. GPS L1 C/A tracking performance: carrier discriminator
output in the presence of a #130-dBW in-band CWI (top) and in
the presence of a single-saw-tooth chirp signal at #130 dBW
(bottom).
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